

Between Al-Azhar and the UIN: Paradigms of Reform in Egyptian and Indonesian Islamic Higher Education

RASHAD BASHEER EL-DESSOUKI

Faculty of Education, Canal Suez University, Egypt
Email: rashahbasheer@csu.eg

M. DJASWIDI AL HAMDANI

Postgraduate Program, Universitas Islam Darussalam (UID), Ciamis, Indonesia
Email: djaswidi@uidc.ac.id

AZIZAH NURAENI

Postgraduate Program, Universitas Islam Darussalam (UID), Ciamis, Indonesia
Email: azizah.nuareni@gmail.com

DEANA SUCI MAULIDA

Postgraduate Program, Universitas Islam Darussalam (UID), Ciamis, Indonesia
Email: deana.sucimaulida@gmail.com

Abstract

The landscape of Islamic higher education in the twenty-first century is marked by a persistent tension between tradition and modernity. Institutions across the Muslim world face the challenge of preserving the sanctity of *‘ulūm al-dīn* (religious sciences) while engaging with the demands of global knowledge economies and secular academic standards. This study examines two emblematic responses to that tension: Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, the millennium-old bastion of Sunni orthodoxy, and Indonesia’s State Islamic University (UIN) system, a contemporary experiment in integrating Islamic and modern sciences. Using a qualitative comparative policy analysis, the research draws on legal documents, institutional statutes, curricula, and reform reports, complemented by secondary literature on Islamic educational reform. Comparatively, Al-Azhar’s paradigm safeguards authority through continuity, while UIN’s cultivates innovation through pluralism. Both confront similar pressures, globalization, market demands, and the politics of religious legitimacy, but respond in divergent ways. The analysis suggests that reform in Islamic higher education is not a uniform process but a spectrum of paradigms shaped by each nation’s political ethos and epistemological vision. For Al-Azhar, the challenge ahead is to reclaim autonomy

without severing tradition; for the UINs, it is to deepen integration beyond structure to methodology. Ultimately, the study argues that the future of Islamic higher education lies not in convergence toward a single model, but in sustaining a plurality of reform trajectories where faith and modernity continue to negotiate their fragile, creative coexistence.

Keywords

Islamic Higher Education, Al-Azhar, UIN, Education Policy, Comparative Reform, Integration of Knowledge, Modernization, Tradition

INTRODUCTION

The tension between *tradition* and *modernity* has haunted Islamic higher education for more than a century, though perhaps the weight of it feels heavier in our own time (Kazmi, 2003). Universities and seminaries across the Muslim world are being asked to do something almost contradictory, to preserve the authenticity of sacred knowledge while simultaneously proving their relevance in an age of global science, technology, and secular rationality. This isn't just a curriculum problem; it's a civilizational one. Every attempt at reform, whether in Cairo, Jakarta, or elsewhere, must find a way to hold together two worlds that often seem to speak different languages.

In the twenty-first century, this challenge has become more visible, even urgent. Rapid globalization, digital transformation, and the rise of transnational educational standards have placed Islamic institutions under a new kind of scrutiny (Moten, 2011). They are now expected to produce graduates who can navigate both the modern labor market and the metaphysical questions of faith. Some have responded by embracing modernization, adding computer science, engineering, or business faculties, while others have sought deeper transformations, reimagining the very relationship between revelation and reason. Reform in Islamic higher education is no longer only about *adding* modern disciplines; it is about rethinking the nature of knowledge itself. Amid this global ferment, Al-Azhar University in Egypt and the State Islamic University (UIN) system in Indonesia stand out as two archetypal experiments. They represent, in a sense, two poles of the Muslim world's ongoing dialogue between tradition and reform.

Al-Azhar, with its millennium-long legacy, remains the symbolic heart of Sunni orthodoxy, a global reference point for theological authority (Mujani et al., 2012). Yet its own internal debates about reform have been fraught and cyclical. Since the

passage of Law No. 103 of 1961, which brought Al-Azhar under close state supervision and introduced secular faculties, the university has lived a paradox: it is both ancient and administrative, revered and regulated (Lashkhia, 2019). In recent decades, every Egyptian regime, from Mubarak to al-Sisi, has called for *tajdid*, renewal, often in the name of “moderation” (Ibrahim Mohamed El-Sayyad, 2025). But the reforms have tended to stop at the surface, curricular adjustments here, digital initiatives there, while the deeper epistemological structure remains intact. Al-Azhar thus stands as a monument of endurance, adapting enough to survive but rarely transforming its intellectual core.

The UIN system, by contrast, represents one of the most ambitious state-sponsored educational experiments in the contemporary Muslim world. Emerging from the transformation of Indonesia’s *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (IAIN), the UINs were born out of a desire to integrate religious and modern sciences within a democratic, pluralistic context (Sumiati & Tekke, 2024). Where Al-Azhar safeguards an inherited canon, the UINs attempt to reinterpret it (Azra, 2003). They aim to produce a new kind of Muslim intellectual, one equally at ease with the Qur’an and quantum physics, with *tafsir* and technology (Kafid & Rohmatika, 2019). It’s a bold project, often uneven in execution, but undeniably innovative in spirit.

Comparing these two institutions is not about measuring progress or prestige. It’s about understanding how different historical and political ecosystems shape what “reform” means. Al-Azhar operates within a centralized, state-controlled environment that prizes stability over experimentation; Indonesia’s UINs grow within a decentralized, democratic space that prizes innovation even at the risk of inconsistency (Abdullah, 2017). One reforms through cautious adaptation, the other through systemic re-imagination. Both, however, reveal the same underlying struggle: how to sustain the soul of Islamic knowledge in a rapidly changing world.

Every serious comparison begins with a question, or, more honestly, with a series of questions that multiply as one looks closer. In this study, our curiosity grows from a simple observation, Al-Azhar and the UIN system stand as two different answers to the same dilemma (Hamdani, 2023). Both claim to reform Islamic higher education, but their ideas of *reform*, their tone, rhythm, and underlying worldview, are entirely distinct.

The first question we ask is the most direct: How do the reform agendas of Al-Azhar and Indonesia’s UIN system differ in their objectives, strategies, and underlying epistemologies since 2000? This is not only about what they have changed, but about *why* and *how* they imagine change. For Al-Azhar, reform tends to mean cautious

adjustment, adding new faculties, softening rhetoric, aligning with the state's discourse of moderation, without altering the structure of religious authority (Ahmed, 2001). For the UINs, reform has become a bolder intellectual project, an attempt to weave theology, science, and social inquiry into a single epistemic fabric.

The second question follows naturally, how have state–institution relationships shaped the scope and nature of reform in each context? In Egypt, the state sits firmly above Al-Azhar, its laws and political moods defining the limits of what the institution can say or do. The history of Law No. 103 of 1961 lingers like a shadow, reminding everyone where power truly resides. In Indonesia, by contrast, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) has acted more like a partner than a master, steering reform but also granting space for universities to define their own paths (Brunner, 2009). The difference may seem procedural, but it changes everything: who drives reform, who owns it, and whose vision of Islam it ultimately serves.

Finally, we ask: What do these two cases reveal about the future directions of Islamic higher education globally? Al-Azhar, rooted in tradition yet burdened by state politics, may signal the limits of institutional reform when authority is centralized. The UIN system, dynamic but still searching for epistemological coherence, might represent the promise, and the fragility, of pluralist experimentation. Together, they hint at a broader truth: that the reform of Islamic education is not a single trajectory but a mosaic of attempts, each shaped by local histories and global pressures.

Perhaps these questions will not lead us to clean answers. But they open a space for reflection, on what it means to modernize without secularizing, to innovate without erasing, and to educate in ways that remain faithful to both revelation and reason.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

When we speak of “reform” in Islamic higher education, we often mean more than the introduction of new curricula or administrative tweaks. Reform, at its deepest level, is a matter of *paradigm*, of how a community envisions knowledge, authority, and the very purpose of learning (Marginson, 2016). Every institution operates within a certain intellectual grammar, a worldview that shapes not only what it teaches but how it defines truth (Marginson, 2016). To understand Al-Azhar and the UIN system, then, we must look beneath their policies and into the assumptions that animate them.

In education studies, the term *policy paradigm* refers to a coherent framework of ideas and values that guide decision-making (Diercks et al., 2019). It's what makes reforms intelligible to their architects and legitimate to their societies. Paradigms don't merely determine the *means* of reform; they determine the *meaning* of reform (Van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003). When the state redefines what counts as "modernization" or "Islamization," it isn't just changing a syllabus, it's rewriting the social contract between tradition and knowledge (Gill, 2020), (Guessoum & Bigliardi, 2023). In this sense, both Al-Azhar and the UIN system are more than universities; they are expressions of distinct policy paradigms forged through different histories of engagement with the modern world.

Within Islamic education, the landscape of reform can be thought of as a spectrum, a shifting line between preservation and transformation. On one end is *modernization*, the effort to update old institutions without disturbing their epistemic core. It is additive that new courses, new technologies, perhaps new administrative structures, but the architecture of thought remains largely intact (Hemerijck, 2020). Al-Azhar's contemporary trajectory fits this mode, a process of managed adaptation, cautious and state-directed, seeking to modernize outputs without unsettling authority.

At the other end lies *transformation*, the more radical attempt to rethink not only what is taught but what is considered *knowledge* (O'Sullivan, 1993). The Indonesian UIN model leans in this direction. Here, reform doesn't merely supplement the traditional canon; it reorganizes it. It redefines the relationship between revelation and reason, integrating Islamic thought with the methodologies of modern science and social inquiry. Transformation is riskier, it invites epistemological experimentation and, inevitably, resistance, but it also opens the possibility of a new intellectual synthesis (Brunner, 2009).

A second axis of this spectrum concerns *who drives reform* that state-managed versus system-led change. In some contexts, reform is imposed from above, often to serve political or security agendas; in others, it grows from within, guided by scholars and educators responding to cultural and global pressures. Egypt exemplifies the former. The state has long treated Al-Azhar as both a partner and a subordinate, its autonomy confined by political imperatives of control and moderation (Montville, 2018). Indonesia, by contrast, offers a case of system-led innovation under state sponsorship. MORA provides structure and funding, yet much of the intellectual energy comes from within the universities themselves, rectors, scholars, and faculty who experiment with models of integration.

Finally, we confront perhaps the most delicate axis: epistemological conservation versus epistemological integration. Conservation seeks to guard the sanctity of revealed knowledge, maintaining the hierarchy that places the classical Islamic sciences at the top. Integration, meanwhile, seeks to dissolve such hierarchies, to allow revelation and reason to inform each other in a shared pursuit of truth. Neither is inherently superior; both carry risks. Conservation can slide into rigidity, while integration can blur the boundaries that give tradition its coherence.

By placing these axes together, we can see how Al-Azhar and the UIN system represent two coherent but contrasting paradigms. Al-Azhar's is a paradigm of *state-managed adaptation*, rooted in preservation, guided by authority, cautious in innovation. The UIN's is one of *systemic-integrationist transformation*, driven by intellectual initiative, oriented toward synthesis, and responsive to democratic and global currents. Both, in their own way, wrestle with the same question: how can Islamic higher education remain faithful to its spiritual heritage while engaging honestly with the conditions of modern knowledge? Perhaps, in the end, a paradigm is not a prison but a mirror, it shows us the limits of our imagination, but also the possibility of renewal.

METHOD

Methodology is often treated as the most technical part of a paper, yet in studies like this, it is closer to a philosophy of seeing. We are not just collecting documents or coding data; we are listening to institutions speak in the languages of law, curriculum, and reform rhetoric. What is said, and what is left unsaid, matters equally. This research, therefore, adopts a comparative case study design, one that treats Al-Azhar and the UIN system not as symmetrical cases, but as two distinct ecosystems of thought. Each carries its own history, politics, and theological rhythm, and comparison here serves less to judge than to understand how different traditions make sense of "reform."

The comparative case study approach allows us to move back and forth between context and concept, to observe how policies emerge, travel, and transform. The goal is not to produce generalizations but to capture the logic of each system as it negotiates change. Al-Azhar's centuries-old conservatism and its uneasy entanglement with the Egyptian state demand a very different interpretive stance than the decentralized, pluralistic experimentation of Indonesia's UINs. Comparison, then, becomes a dialogue: each case illuminates the other's blind spots.

For data collection, we rely primarily on documentary evidence, the artifacts through which institutions declare what they value. These include government laws and decrees, particularly Egypt's Law No. 103 of 1961 and Indonesia's series of ministerial regulations guiding IAIN-to-UIN conversions; university statutes and strategic plans; official curricula; accreditation reports; and reform blueprints from the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education and Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). Alongside these, we examine secondary sources, historical accounts, academic critiques, and policy analyses written by scholars of Islamic education, to fill the contextual gaps that official texts often hide.

For data analysis, we employ thematic and critical comparative policy analysis. Each document is read as both a policy statement and a cultural text. We identify recurring motifs, "renewal," "moderation," "integration of knowledge," "modernization," "authenticity", and trace how these terms function differently in Cairo and Jakarta. The analysis also attends to absences: where silence signals constraint, where rhetoric masks stagnation, and where genuine innovation flickers beneath bureaucratic language.

There are, of course, limitations. Documentary sources tell only part of the story. They reflect intentions, not always realities. Al-Azhar's official decrees, for example, may project unity while concealing deep internal contestation. UIN policy papers may proclaim integration while masking epistemic tensions within faculties. Interviews and classroom ethnographies could enrich this picture, but for now, our purpose is to capture the paradigmatic logic visible in the official record.

Ultimately, this methodology rests on a conviction: that policies are not neutral instruments but expressions of belief. In the Muslim world, especially, education policy is theology by other means. Reading these documents comparatively allows us to glimpse how two great traditions, one Arab and ancient, the other Southeast Asian and reformist, imagine the relationship between knowledge, faith, and modernity.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Al-Azhar Paradigm: State-Managed Adaptation

Al-Azhar is less a university than an inheritance, a living institution that has, for over a millennium, defined what it means to seek knowledge within Sunni Islam. Founded in the tenth century under the Fatimids and later reclaimed by Sunni orthodoxy, it has survived empires, revolutions, colonialism, and modern statehood (As'ad et al., 2021). Yet its very longevity has become both its strength and its constraint. To

speak of “reform” at Al-Azhar is to speak of a system in motion and paralysis at once: an institution constantly adjusting to survive, but rarely reimagining itself at the deepest level.

The historical context matters. For most of its existence, Al-Azhar’s authority rested on its independence from political power, a sanctuary of scholarship where ‘*ulamā*’ debated theology, law, and language without direct state interference. That autonomy was fundamentally altered by Law No. 103 of 1961, introduced during Nasser’s rule. The law aimed to modernize and nationalize the institution: Al-Azhar was restructured as a state university, its leadership appointed by presidential decree, and its curriculum expanded to include secular faculties such as medicine, engineering, and commerce. The move was revolutionary, and deeply ambivalent. It institutionalized reform but also subordinated Al-Azhar to the Egyptian state, binding its fate to political agendas.

This architecture of control has shaped every subsequent reform effort. Under Mubarak, the state leaned on Al-Azhar to promote a “moderate” Islam compatible with regime stability. Under Morsi’s brief presidency, there were attempts to reassert clerical influence, though these were short-lived. Under al-Sisi, the discourse of “renewal” (*tajdid al-khiṭāb al-dīnī*) became central, a call to reform religious discourse, often more about security and image than intellectual innovation. Al-Azhar’s leaders echoed this rhetoric, sometimes defensively, emphasizing moderation (*wasatiyyah*) while resisting external attempts to redefine theology. The result is a pattern of state-managed adaptation: reform that is continuous but constrained, progressive in appearance yet conservative in spirit.

At the curricular level, the changes since 2000 reflect this ambivalence. New subjects have been added, foreign languages, computer science, even environmental studies, but these exist alongside the dense, classical corpus of ‘*ulūm al-dīn: fiqh, tafsīr, hadīth, ‘aqīdah*. The secular faculties have expanded, but the epistemological hierarchy remains untouched. Religious sciences still occupy the apex of legitimacy, while newer disciplines function as peripheral, utilitarian additions. Even the so-called “renewal” curriculum initiatives, introducing interdisciplinary programs or civic education, tend to be framed as defensive measures against extremism, rather than as genuine epistemological reform.

The drivers of Al-Azhar’s reform have been largely external. The Egyptian state’s concern with religious radicalism, its desire to maintain international legitimacy as a beacon of “moderate Islam,” and the pragmatic need to align education with the labor market all converge to pressure Al-Azhar toward modernization. Yet

the constraints are formidable. Internally, the senior *‘ulamā’* guard the integrity of the tradition with a mixture of reverence and fear, fear that reform might dilute the sacred sciences or politicize theology even further. Externally, the state’s tight control and periodic use of Al-Azhar as a political instrument erode academic independence. The result is an institution perpetually negotiating between preservation and adaptation, rarely permitted to define reform on its own terms.

Still, one must be careful not to dismiss Al-Azhar as stagnant. It remains a global reference point, educating thousands of students from Africa and Asia, and producing scholars whose voices carry moral weight across the Muslim world. Its gradualist approach, what some might call *tajdīd bi-lā taḥyīr* (renewal without alteration), may seem timid, yet it reflects a worldview in which continuity is itself a form of resistance. Reform, in this paradigm, is about protecting the boundaries of orthodoxy while allowing just enough flexibility to survive the age of mass education and political volatility.

In that sense, Al-Azhar’s paradigm might be described as a kind of controlled evolution. It changes so that it can remain the same, a paradox that has ensured its survival for over a thousand years, even as the world around it keeps reinventing what it means to know.

The UIN Paradigm: Systemic-Integrationist Transformation

If Al-Azhar represents the gravitational pull of continuity, Indonesia’s UIN system embodies movement, messy, ambitious, and irreversibly modern. The transformation of Indonesia’s State Islamic Institutes (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, or IAIN) into State Islamic Universities (*Universitas Islam Negeri*, or UIN) since the early 2000s marks one of the most far-reaching reform projects in the Muslim educational world. It is not simply an administrative upgrade; it is an attempt to rebuild the very architecture of knowledge, to reconcile *‘ulūm al-dīn* and *‘ulūm al-dunyā* within a pluralist, democratic framework.

The historical context of the UIN system traces back to Indonesia’s early independence. The *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* established in 1945 eventually evolved into IAINs during the 1960s, designed primarily to train *ulama*, teachers, and bureaucrats for the newly independent state. But as the country modernized, and as Islam itself began to seek a more dialogical relationship with science, technology, and the humanities, the IAINs faced a dilemma. Could they remain relevant without becoming secular? Could they modernize without losing their soul?

By the 1990s and especially after 1998, as democratization reshaped Indonesia's political culture, these questions grew urgent. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) became both steward and catalyst of reform. MORA's policy vision reframed Islamic higher education as part of the nation's intellectual modernization: institutions were encouraged to expand into comprehensive universities. Thus began the transformation of IAINs into UINs, starting with Jakarta and Yogyakarta, later followed by Makassar, Malang, Bandung, and dozens of others. Each conversion represented not just new faculties and buildings, but a reorientation of purpose: to create Muslim scholars capable of bridging revelation and empirical inquiry.

The manifestations of reform in the UIN paradigm are striking. The most visible is the creation of new faculties, science, medicine, psychology, social and political studies, within traditionally religious institutions. These additions were not ornamental; they embodied an epistemological statement: that all knowledge, sacred or scientific, flows from the same divine source. The "Integration of Knowledge" (*Integrasi Keilmuan*) project became the ideological spine of the reform, operationalized through models like the Integration-Interconnection (I-I) Curriculum at UIN Sunan Kalijaga. Under this model, the Qur'an and Hadith are not confined to theology classes but become interpretive lenses across disciplines. Students of economics study market ethics through Islamic jurisprudence; students of biology are encouraged to reflect on *ayat kauniyyah*, the signs of God in nature.

Other UINs experimented with their own approaches: UIN Malang's "Tree of Knowledge" (*Pohon Ilmu*) model, symbolizing the rootedness of modern disciplines in divine revelation; UIN Jakarta's push for international collaborations and interdisciplinary research; UIN Bandung's emphasis on Islamic integration in technology and innovation. In all of these, the spirit of reform is not imitation but synthesis.

The drivers behind this transformation are multiple. The opening of the democratic space after Suharto's fall allowed intellectuals greater freedom to rethink Islamic education. Figures like Azyumardi Azra, Amin Abdullah, and Komaruddin Hidayat championed reform not merely as modernization but as an act of intellectual *ijtihad*. Globalization added its own pressure: universities needed to compete internationally, attract funding, and align with global accreditation standards. At the same time, domestic forces, market demands, interfaith pluralism, and the state's own aspiration for moderation, gave the UINs both legitimacy and urgency.

But the project has not been without constraints. Integrating epistemologies is far harder than merging faculties. Many lecturers, trained in either classical Islamic

sciences or secular disciplines, struggled to find a shared intellectual language. The curriculum sometimes veered toward tokenism, adding Islamic verses to scientific materials without engaging in true methodological integration. Traditionalist scholars accused the UINs of diluting religious depth; secular critics doubted their scientific rigor. The very pluralism that made integration possible also made it unstable.

Yet, despite these tensions, the UIN paradigm represents something genuinely new: a reform that is neither defensive nor derivative. It does not seek to protect tradition from modernity, nor to surrender it. Instead, it treats the university itself as a site of dialogue, a *majlis al-‘ilm* where revelation and reason coexist not as rivals, but as partners in an unfinished conversation.

In the broad arc of Islamic educational reform, UINs occupy a unique position: they are not heirs of Al-Azhar’s classical authority, nor imitators of Western modernity. They are something in between, a living experiment in epistemological pluralism. And like all experiments, they remain in process, evolving through contradiction and compromise. Still, the ambition is unmistakable: to produce a generation of Muslim intellectuals who are at home in both the mosque and the laboratory, the *madrasa* and the marketplace (Zeghal, 2007).

Comparative Analysis: Juxtaposing the Two Paradigms

To place Al-Azhar and the UIN system side by side is to watch two worlds wrestling with the same question, what does it mean to reform, yet answering in opposite accents. Both claim renewal, both invoke the unity of knowledge, both operate within Muslim-majority nations seeking to balance piety and progress. Yet their strategies, their rhythms, even their silences reveal two divergent civilizational instincts (Hatina, 2003).

The first and perhaps most fundamental difference lies in the nature of reform itself. Al-Azhar’s reform is *additive*: modernization without rupture. It adds subjects, modernizes facilities, and updates rhetoric, but leaves the traditional epistemic hierarchy untouched. The religious sciences remain the immovable center, while the “new” disciplines orbit around them like tolerated satellites. This is reform as adaptation, careful, reversible, state-managed. By contrast, the UIN model represents *transformative reform*: it doesn’t just expand the structure; it rearranges its intellectual DNA (Leonid, 2017). When faculties of medicine, technology, and psychology are founded inside an Islamic university, the boundaries of sacred and secular knowledge begin to blur. Reform, here, becomes a creative act, not preservation but reinvention.

The role of the state further sharpens this contrast. In Egypt, the state functions as Al-Azhar's overseer, its reform agenda inseparable from national security, politics, and global image-making. The institution's autonomy is symbolic rather than real. Each president, from Nasser to al-Sisi, has used Al-Azhar to project an image of moderation to the world while keeping the religious sphere firmly within the regime's grasp. Indonesia's relationship with the UINs, however, operates through partnership more than domination. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) sets frameworks and provides funding, but universities enjoy significant discretion to experiment. Reform here is bureaucratically structured yet intellectually open, a rare balance that allows innovation without inviting political collapse.

Beneath these institutional dynamics lies an even deeper divergence to the epistemological core. Al-Azhar's paradigm maintains a vertical order of knowledge. At its peak sit the transmitted sciences, Qur'an, Hadith, Fiqh, and Kalam, seen as divinely anchored and epistemologically complete. The modern disciplines, useful but morally neutral, occupy lower ranks in legitimacy. The UIN model, conversely, seeks horizontal synthesis: a dialogical relation in which revelation and reason, theology and technology, each inform and refine the other. The "Integration of Knowledge" project aspires to dismantle the binary between sacred and empirical, not by erasing it but by weaving the two into a continuous intellectual fabric.

These contrasting paradigms produce distinct graduate identities. Al-Azhar forms the *'ālim*, a scholar grounded in textual mastery and moral guardianship. Even as modernization expands their vocational scope, Al-Azhar graduates remain anchored in an ethos of preservation: their authority derives from continuity. The UINs, by contrast, aspire to cultivate the *Muslim intellectual*: someone fluent in both religious and modern discourses, able to navigate the laboratory and the pulpit with equal ease. Whether this synthesis is fully achieved is debatable, but the aspiration itself marks a profound shift in how Islamic higher education imagines the modern believer-scholar.

Yet, for all their differences, both systems face the same external pressures, globalization, market competition, and the rising demand for measurable outcomes. In Egypt, this pressure often reinforces conformity: Al-Azhar invokes moderation and tradition as bulwarks against Westernization. In Indonesia, it fuels ambition: UINs chase global rankings and partnerships, sometimes at the risk of losing their distinctive Islamic ethos. Both models thus stand at an epistemic crossroads, negotiating between the spiritual and the pragmatic, between authenticity and relevance.

Perhaps what unites them, paradoxically, is their shared vulnerability to the modern world's impatience. Reform takes time, and both Al-Azhar's caution and the UIN's experimentation are responses to that pressure. One seeks safety in continuity; the other risks coherence in innovation. Both, in their own way, remind us that the quest to integrate Islam and modernity is not a race but a dialogue, a dialogue without a final word.

CONCLUSION

If we step back now, after tracing Al-Azhar's caution and the UIN's daring, the contrast between them feels less like a competition and more like a reflection of the Muslim world's plural search for renewal. Both inhabit the same intellectual anxiety: how to modernize without secularizing, how to reform without rupture. Yet they stand at opposite ends of the reform spectrum, one conserving, the other transforming, each shaped by its own political and cultural gravity.

In summary, Al-Azhar exemplifies what might be called a *state-managed adaptation* paradigm. Its reforms are deliberate, centralized, and carefully contained within the boundaries of orthodoxy. It modernizes infrastructure and expands curricula but preserves the traditional hierarchy of the sacred sciences. The university remains both guardian and captive, guardian of a thousand-year legacy, captive to the state that claims to protect it. The UIN system, by contrast, embodies a *systemic-integrationist transformation*. Reform here is decentralized, participatory, and sometimes messy. It reimagines the structure of knowledge itself, treating revelation and empirical inquiry as complementary rather than competitive. The difference is not just procedural, it is epistemological, even civilizational.

From a theoretical standpoint, these two paradigms show that reform in Islamic higher education cannot be reduced to modernization alone. It must be understood as a negotiation between power and knowledge, between state ideology and intellectual autonomy. Al-Azhar's model demonstrates how reform can survive under constraint, while the UIN model illustrates how freedom and pluralism can become engines of epistemological creativity. Together they sketch a continuum of possibilities, from preservation to transformation, along which other Muslim educational systems (Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, even Western Islamic institutions) might locate themselves.

The practical implications extend beyond the two cases. For Al-Azhar, the challenge is to reconcile its immense moral authority with the intellectual humility

needed for genuine renewal. Its strength, continuity, has become its weakness when continuity hardens into inertia. The future may depend on whether it can loosen its alliance with state power and reclaim its scholarly autonomy without losing legitimacy. For Indonesia's UINs, the challenge runs in the opposite direction: to move beyond structural and rhetorical integration toward a deeper, methodological synthesis. Integration must happen not only in curricula but in the minds of scholars, where *fiqh* and philosophy, science and spirituality, can genuinely converse.

For the broader Muslim world, these twin paradigms suggest that there will never be a single center of educational gravity again. The age of a solitary intellectual Mecca, be it Baghdad, Cairo, or elsewhere, has passed. Instead, we are entering a constellation of centers, each experimenting in its own way with the tension between revelation and reason. The vitality of Islamic higher education will depend less on uniformity and more on the ability to sustain dialogue among these diverse reform traditions.

Perhaps this is the quiet lesson both Al-Azhar and the UIN system offer: that reform is not a one-time act but an evolving relationship between faith, knowledge, and the modern world. Al-Azhar teaches patience, the endurance of tradition in a turbulent century. The UINs teach courage, the willingness to reimagine what tradition can become. And between patience and courage lies the future of Islamic higher education: not a perfect synthesis, but a living, contested, and endlessly renewing conversation.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, M. A. (2017). Islamic studies in higher education in Indonesia: Challenges, impact and prospects for the world community. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 55(2), 391–426.
- Ahmed, A. C. (2001). Islamic mission in sub-Saharan Africa. the perspectives of some 'Ulamā' associated with the Al-Azhar University (1960-1970). *Die Welt des islams*, 348–378.
- As'ad, Putra, D. I. A., & Arfan. (2021). Being al-Wasatiyah Agents: The Role of Azharite Organization Indexing in the Moderation of Indonesian Religious Constellation. *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization*, 11(2), 124–145. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.32350/iitc.11.2.07>
- Azra, A. (2003). IAIN di Tengah Paradigma Baru Perguruan Tinggi. *Jurnal Inovasi*

Pendidikan Tinggi Agama Islam, VI.

- Brunner, R. (2009). Education, politics, and the struggle for intellectual leadership: Al-Azhar between 1927 and 1945. In Meir Hatina (Ed.), *Guardians of faith in modern times: 'Ulama' in the Middle East*. Leiden: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.
- Diercks, G., Larsen, H., & Steward, F. (2019). Transformative innovation policy: Addressing variety in an emerging policy paradigm. *Research Policy*, 48(4), 880–894.
- Gill, M. (2020). What is Islamization of Knowledge? Diambil dari http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00004595&channel=universityave&start=0&end=9&chapter=1&page=1
- Guessoum, N., & Bigliardi, S. (2023). *Islam and Science: Past, Present, and Future Debates*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/9781009266550>
- Hamdani, N. A. (2023). Scrutinizing Islamic Higher Education Institutions in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 9(1), 79–92.
- Hatina, M. (2003). Historical legacy and the challenge of modernity in the Middle East: The case of al-Azhar in Egypt. *The Muslim World*, 93(1), 51.
- Hemerijck, A. (2020). Social investment as a policy paradigm. In *The Future of the Social Investment State* (hal. 10–27). Routledge.
- Ibrahim Mohamed El-Sayyad, A. (2025). Coexistence in Islam: Al-Azhar's Role in Advancing Moderation and Tolerance. *Annual Journal of the Faculty of Islamic and Arabic Studies for Girls, Mansoura*, 27(1), 561–644.
- Kafid, N., & Rohmatika, A. (2019). Academic social capital and institutional transformation of Islamic higher education in Indonesia. *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*, 24(2), 335–352.
- Kazmi, Y. (2003). Islamic education: Traditional education or education of tradition? *Islamic Studies*, 42(2), 259–288.
- Lashkhia, Y. V. (2019). Al-Azhar university in the events of the Arab spring (Case of Egypt). *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 19(4), 583–596.
- Leonid, G. (2017). The processes of systemic integration in the world system. *Journal of Globalization Studies*, 8(1), 97–118.
- Marginson, S. (2016). The global construction of higher education reform. In *The*

- handbook of global education policy* (hal. 291–311). London: Wiley Online Library.
- Montville, J. V. (2018). From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation. *The Middle East Journal*, 72(3), 517–518.
- Moten, A. R. (2011). Modernity, tradition and modernity in tradition in Muslim societies. *Intellectual Discourse*, 19(1).
- Mujani, W. K., Abdullah, I., & Bakar, I. A. (2012). The role of the al-Azhar university in the dissemination of Islamic religious knowledge in Malaysia. *Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences*, 1411–1414.
- O’Sullivan, D. (1993). The concept of policy paradigm: elaboration and illumination. *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET)/Revue de La Pensée Educative*, 246–272.
- Sumiati, E., & Tekke, M. (2024). Transformation of Islamic Higher Education: Policy Strategy, Challenges, and Opportunities. *Al-Hayat: Journal of Islamic Education*, 8(4), 1399–1417.
- Van Cuilenburg, J., & McQuail, D. (2003). Media policy paradigm shifts: Towards a new communications policy paradigm. *European journal of communication*, 18(2), 181–207.
- Zeghal, M. (2007). The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge and Discourse: The Case of al-Azhar in Twentieth-Century Egypt.”. *Hefner and Zaman, Schooling Islam*, 107–130.